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ARTICLES
A Guide to Monetary Sanctions for
Environmental Violations by
Federal Facilities
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES L. GREEN*
I. Introduction
Nearly all federal pollution statutes provide waivers of sover-
eign immunity to require compliance by federal agencies1 and
their facilities.2 On each of three occasions that the Supreme
Court has considered the scope of such a waiver, the Court has
interpreted the waiver narrowly.3 Congress has acted to override
these decisions as to some, but not all, of the environmental stat-
utes containing waivers that were called into doubt by the
Supreme Court's decisions.
* Lieutenent Colonel Green is an active-duty Army judge advocate, currently
assigned as an Instructor at the United States Military Academy. The views ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not reflect the official posi-
tion or policy of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
1. The federal facilities provisions of these statutes typically require compliance
not only by federal agencies, but also by "[elach department, agency, and instrumen-
tality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government."
See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994).
2. See Clean Water Act (CWA) § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994); Clean Air Act
(CAA) § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 120, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620 (1994); Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1447, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6; RCRA Subtitle I (Regulation
of Underground Storage Tanks) § 9007, 42 U.S.C. § 6991f (1994); Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) § 408, 15 U.S.C. § 2688 (control of lead-based paint hazards)
(1994); Noise Control Act § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (1994).
3. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-80 (1976) (concluding waiver of sovereign
immunity under CAA Section 118 did not require federal facilities to comply with
state permitting requirements); EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (same conclu-
sion as to CWA § 313); United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)
(holding waiver of sovereign immunity under citizen suit provisions and federal facili-
ties provisions of RCRA and CWA did not permit imposition of civil penalties against
federal facilities).
1
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This paper will first review the Court's holdings in these cases
both to determine the current efficacy of the waiver of federal sov-
ereign immunity in the specific environmental statutes concerned
in each case and to develop a framework for analyzing the waivers
under the remaining statutes. The main section of the paper ex-
amines the availability of civil penalties against the United States
under these statutes and will focus particularly on the scope of
federal sovereign immunity under the Clean Air Act. It will con-
clude that the Act's citizen suit provision provides a viable, but as
yet unused, basis to impose civil penalties against federal
facilities.
II. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Federal
Sovereign Immunity for Environmental Violations
It is a fundamental precept of Anglo-American law that the
sovereign may not be sued except when the sovereign consents to
be sued. Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has
long held that, to be valid, any waiver of the United States' sover-
eign immunity must be expressed clearly and unequivocally 4 and
that such waivers must be "construed strictly in favor of the
sovereign."5
Given the enormous scale and range of its activities, the fed-
eral government has been, through much of this century, one of
the nation's largest sources of environmental pollution. But with
the sudden expansion of federal pollution regulation that began in
1970, the United States charged itself with the responsibility of
protecting the nation's environment. In erecting this legislative
scheme, Congress simultaneously transformed the United States
into both an environmental regulator and also a regulated entity.
This transformation can be traced through the evolution of federal
air pollution regulation. 6
In 1959, Congress stated as its intent that federal facilities
shall, "to the extent practicable and consistent with the interests
of the United States and within any available appropriations,"7
cooperate with federal, state, and local air pollution control agen-
cies in preventing or controlling air pollution emitting from such
4. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
5. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).
6. See generally Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity
Waivers in Environmental Law, 15 ENvTL. L. REP. 10326 (1985).
7. Pub. L. No. 86-365, § 2, 73 Stat. 646 (1959).
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facilities.8 The Clean Air Act of 1963 (CAA), which incorporated
this rather modest obligation from the 1959 law also required that
federal agencies obtain federal permits for air emissions that
might endanger human health or welfare.9 But despite these
laws, federal facilities remained largely unregulated by air pollu-
tion control standards until the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970.
The 1970 CAA Amendments were exceptional, not only in es-
tablishing a comprehensive system for national air pollution con-
trol, but also in waiving federal sovereign immunity so as to
require federal facilities to "comply with Federal, State, inter-
state, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of
air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements.' 10 In the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), Congress added language closely modeled on the CAA's
federal facilities provision to also mandate federal compliance
with water pollution requirements.1 ' In 1976, the Supreme Court
addressed the scope of these waivers in two companion cases,
Hancock v. Train12 and EPA v. California.13
In Hancock, the Court considered whether the provision of the
CAA that required federal installations to comply with the Act's
pollution abatement requirements, as discussed above, also re-
quired compliance with state permitting requirements. Citing the
"fundamental importance of the principles shielding federal in-
stallations and activities from regulation by the States," the Court
stated that the federal government may be subjected to state regu-
lation only when, and to the extent that, congressional authoriza-
tion is "clear and unambiguous."1 4 The Court noted that, in this
provision, Congress had only mandated compliance with "State
. . . requirements," rather than with "[a]ll State . . . require-
ments."15 Based on both the statutory text and its legislative his-
tory, the Court concluded that the CAA obligated federal
8. See id.
9. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 7, 77 Stat. 392, 399 (1959).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689 (1970).
11. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 875 (1972) (requiring federal facilities to
"comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and
abatement of pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements").
12. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
13. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
14. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. at 179.
15. Id. at 182.
1999]
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installations to comply with state substantive requirements, but
not with procedural requirements such as permitting. 16 In EPA v.
California,17 the Court reached the same conclusion as to the
nearly identical waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the
FWPCA. 18
In 1977, Congress promptly responded to the Hancock and
EPA v. California decisions by amending the federal facilities pro-
visions of the CAA and FWPCA to explicitly subject the federal
government to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local require-
ments," regardless of whether such requirements are "substantive
or procedural," and specifically listing permitting requirements as
among those requirements. 19 Congress included identical lan-
guage in the federal facilities provisions it added to the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in 197720 and to the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1978.21 Moreover, the
amendments to RCRA, the FWPCA, and the CAA also waived sov-
ereign immunity as to any "sanction" imposed to enforce compli-
ance, thereby setting the stage for the next conflict between the
states and the federal government over the scope of the United
States' liability for environmental violations.
A. Waiver of Immunity for Civil Penalties
The Supreme Court decided United States Department of En-
ergy v. Ohio22 in 1992 in order to resolve a split that had devel-
oped in the circuit courts as to whether the waiver for "sanctions"
that Congress added to the federal facilities provisions contained
in the CWA and RCRA permitted the imposition of punitive fines
by states. 23 In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the
16. Id. at 198.
17. Supra note 12.
18. 426 U.S. 200.
19. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 61, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Clean Air Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1393 (1977).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-580, 92 Stat. 2475 (1978)
22. 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
23. The Sixth Circuit held in the case below, Ohio v. United States Dep't of En-
ergy, 904 F.2d 1058 (1990), that the CWA's federal facility provision waived sovereign
immunity from punitive fines, conflicting with the Ninth Circuit's finding of no such
waiver in California v. United States Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Tenth Circuit had found that the CWA's citizen suit section permitted punitive
sanctions. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, 1428 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S.
902 (1992). Two circuit courts had agreed with the Sixth Circuit below that RCRA's
federal facilities provision did not permit the imposition of punitive fines. Mitzelfelt
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State of Ohio had sued the U.S. Department of Energy (hereinaf-
ter "DOE") for civil penalties based on violations of state and fed-
eral pollution laws, including the CWA and RCRA, arising from
DOE's operation of its uranium processing plant in Fernald,
Ohio. 24 DOE conceded that the CWA and RCRA subject federal
agencies to fines imposed to induce them to comply with injunc-
tions or with other judicial orders designed to modify behavior
prospectively. 25 The Court termed such forward-looking sanctions
"coercive fines."26 The Court distinguished these "coercive fines"
from "punitive fines," which are monetary sanctions "imposed to
punish past violations of those statutes or state laws supplanting
them."27 Since DOE did not dispute that the CWA and RCRA per-
mitted "coercive" fines against federal agencies, 28 the only issue
before the Court was whether the CWA and RCRA waive sover-
eign immunity for "punitive" fines.
Justice Souter began the Court's opinion by setting out the
standard of review for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. In
order to be valid, the Court stated that such a waiver must be
unequivocal, must be strictly construed in favor of the govern-
ment, and must not be enlarged beyond what the statutory lan-
guage requires.29
The Court first considered Ohio's contention that the citizen
suit sections in the CWA and RCRA permit the imposition of civil
penalties against federal agencies. Both citizen suit provisions
specifically include the United States as a "person" against whom
suit may be brought and incorporate the Acts' civil penalties sec-
tion.30 Moreover, the Court noted that it was undisputed that the
v. Dep't of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Washing-
ton, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 1989).
24. See United States Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 612.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 613.
27. Id. at 613-14.
28. Id. at 619, n.15.
29. Id. at 615.
30. The CWA's citizen suit provision states:
[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf.., against
any person (including ... the United States) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-
dard or limitation .... The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to
enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order ... and
to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [section 119(d) of the CWA].
CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
RCRA's citizen suit provision, provides:
1999]
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"civil penalties" referenced in those sections authorize punitive
fines.31 Therefore, Ohio argued,3 2 it was apparent that Congress
must have intended to subject the United States to punitive fines
under the civil penalties provisions contained in the CWA33 and in
RCRA.34
The Court did not find the statutory scheme of the Acts to be
so simple. It noted that the civil penalties provided for in the Acts'
citizen suit provisions only applied to "persons" and that the
United States was not a "person" as defined in the general defini-
tions section of either the CWA or RCRA. 35 However, the Court
found that the United States is specifically included in the citizen
suit provisions of both the CWA and RCRA as a "person" against
whom a citizen suit could be brought.36 However, the citizen suit
provisions' special definitions of "person" did not broaden the
scope of the Acts' general definitions of the term, which omitted
the United States.37 Therefore, the United States was not among
[Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf.., against
any person (including... the United States) ... who is alleged to be in
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, pro-
hibition, or other order which has become effective pursuant to this chap-
ter... (B) against any person, including the United States... who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, stor-
age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment .... The district court shall have jurisdiction
. . . to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or other order.., and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under [section 3008(a) and (g) of RCRA].
RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
31. 503 U.S. at 617.
32. Id. at 616-17.
33. The CWA's civil penalty provision, authorizes the imposition of civil penalties
of not more than $25,000 per day per violation through judicial enforcement and per-
mits lesser amounts to be imposed administratively. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(1994).
34. RCRA's civil penalties provision authorizes the imposition through either ad-
ministrative or judicial enforcement of civil penalties of not more than $25,000 per
day per violation. See RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994).
35. 503 U.S. at 617. CWA section 502(5) provides: "The term 'person' means an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1994).
RCRA § 1004, at the time United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio was decided, pro-
vided: "The term 'person' means an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, cor-
poration (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body...."
42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1994).
36. 503 U.S. at 619.
37. Id. at 619, n.14.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/3
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the class of "person(s)" subject to civil penalties under the citizen
suit provisions of the CWA and RCRA.38
The Court next looked for a waiver for civil penalties in the
federal facilities provision of the CWA, Section 313 which subjects
the United States to "all . . . State ... process and sanctions" for
water pollution violations.39 Ohio argued that the word "sanc-
tion," as used in this section, must encompass punitive fines.40
The Court disagreed based on dictionary definitions of the
term and a review of federal case law. The Court concluded that
"the meaning of 'sanction' is spacious enough to cover not only
what we have called punitive fines, but coercive ones as well, and
use of the term carries no necessary implication that a reference
to punitive fines is intended." 41
The Court also considered the meaning of "sanction" in the
context of the phrase "process and sanction."42 The Court found it
significant that "sanction" was coupled, not with "requirements,"
but instead with "process."43 The Court stated that "process" re-
fers to the mechanics of enforcing a judicial order, typically
through "coercive" sanctions. 44 In contrast, the term "require-
ments" encompasses the substantive provisions of the Act, viola-
tions of which would be sanctioned through either punitive or
coercive measures. 45 Since "sanction" appears in connection with
38. Id. at 617-18.
39. CWA Section 313 states:
[Tihe Federal Government ... shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative author-
ity, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution in the same manner... as any nongovernmental entity
.... The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether
substantive or procedural (including any recordkeeping or reporting re-
quirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other require-
ment, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State or local
administrative authority, and (C) to any process and sanction, whether
enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner. ...
[Tihe United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State .. .to enforce an order or the
process of such court.
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).
40. See 503 U.S. at 620.
41. Id. at 621.
42. Id. at 622-23.
43. Id. at 623.
44. See id.
45. See 503 U.S. at 623.
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"process" and not "requirements," the Court concluded that Con-
gress was using the term only in its coercive sense. 4
6
The Court next considered the last sentence of Section 313(a)
which states that "[tihe United States shall be liable only for those
civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State...
to enforce an order or the process of such court."47 The Court first
observed that the use of the term "civil penalties" in this sentence
did not provide an independent grant to impose punitive fines
against the federal government.48 Rather, it simply clarified that
the "sanctions" authorized elsewhere in the section included civil
penalties imposed to enforce the order of a court, i.e., coercive
sanctions. 49
The Court, however, was unable to determine what Congress
meant by its reference to civil penalties "arising under Federal
law." Ohio argued that this phrase should permit the imposition
of a fine for the violation of an EPA-approved state law enacted to
supplant the CWA.50 The Court agreed that the term "civil penal-
ties" in this context appeared to include both coercive and punitive
sanctions. 51 The problem, the Court noted, was that there was no
federal law that permitted the imposition of civil penalties against
the United States since it had already determined that the CWA's
civil penalties section did not include the United States within its
definition of "person(s)" against whom punitive sanctions could be
applied.5 2 Therefore, given the requirement that any waiver of
sovereign immunity must be expressed unequivocally, the Court
found that the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the
CWA's federal facilities provision permits coercive, but not puni-
tive fines. 53
Finally, the Court considered whether RCRA's federal facili-
ties provision, Section 6001, authorized the imposition of civil pen-
alties. 54 The Court concluded that this provision, which subjects
46. See id.
47. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
48. 503 U.S. at 624.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 624-25.
51. See id. at 624.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 627.
54. At the time United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio was decided, RCRA Section
6001 provided that the federal government:
ISIhall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any re-
quirement for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief
[Vol. 17
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federal facilities to "all ... requirements" applicable to the man-
agement and disposal of solid or hazardous waste, could reason-
ably be interpreted as including the Act's substantive
requirements and the means for implementing them, but exclud-
ing punitive fines.55 The Court noted that it had already deter-
mined that substantive requirements can be enforced either
punitively or coercively. 56 The Court also found it significant that
the examples of such requirements listed in RCRA Section 6001
only included review for compliance ("permits or reporting") or
mechanisms for enforcing compliance in the future ("provisions for
injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court
to enforce such relief').57 It observed that the absence of any ex-
ample of punitive fines in this section "is powerful evidence that
Congress had no intent to subject the United States to an enforce-
ment mechanism that could deplete the federal fisc regardless of a
responsible officer's willingness and capacity to comply in the fu-
ture."5 8 Accordingly, the Court held that neither the CWA nor
RCRA contained a waiver of sovereign immunity that would per-
mit the imposition of punitive sanctions against the United
States. 59
III. Federal Immunity From Civil Penalties for
Environmental Violation After DOE v. Ohio
Apart from its immediate effect on the CWA and RCRA, DOE
v. Ohio also called into question the scope of the United States'
sovereign immunity under various other federal pollution control
statutes containing waiver provisions that are (or were) very simi-
lar to the waivers the Court consider in DOE v. Ohio. Congress
has acted to overturn the effect of DOE v. Ohio as to some, but not
all of the environmental statutes affected by that decision. Conse-
quently, civil penalties are now clearly precluded under some stat-
utes, clearly permitted under others, and subject to dispute in the
and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief)
... in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject
to such requirements .... Neither the United States, nor any agent,
employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any process
or sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect to the enforcement
of any such injunctive relief.
See 503 U.S. at 627.
55. See id. at 627-28.
56. See id. at 628.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 611.
1999]
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remainder. The remainder of this article will examine the availa-
bility of punitive sanctions against the United States under each
of these laws.
B. Statutes Under Which Civil Penalties Clearly Are Not
Available
1. The Clean Water Act
DOE v. Ohio held that civil penalties for violations of the CWA
were not available against the United States under either the fed-
eral facilities or citizens suit provisions of the Act. Legislation to
reverse DOE v. Ohio's CWA holdings has repeatedly been intro-
duced in Congress, but none has been successful. 60 Thus, states
and citizens seeking to compel a federal facility's compliance with
the CWA may seek injunctive relief,61 but punitive fines remain
unavailable. 62
2. The Noise Control Act 63
The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the federal
programs provision of the Noise Control Act, provides only that
"the Federal Government . . . shall comply with Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abate-
ment of environmental noise to the same extent that any person is
subject to such requirements."64
As the Noise Control Act contains no provision for either
"sanctions" or "civil penalties," the Act plainly would not permit
the imposition of fines against federal agencies, punitive or other-
60. See, e.g., S. 1923, 105th Cong. (proposing the "Federal Facilities Clean Water
Compliance Act of 1998" to allow fines against the federal government for Clean
Water Act violations); H.R. 961, 104th Cong. § 303(a) (1995); H.R. 340, 103d Cong.
(1993).
61. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982) (stating
court in a citizen suit brought against a federal agency under the CWA retains its
traditional equitable discretion to order relief that will achieve compliance with the
Act).
62. But see Pennsylvania Dep't of Envt'l Resources v. United States Postal Serv.,
13 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
contained in federal facilities provision of Clean Water Act did not narrow the broader
"sue-and-be-sued" provision in Postal Reorganization Act, permitting the imposition
of civil penalties by state against U.S. Postal Service).
63. The Noise Control Act was enacted in 1972. Although EPA has been stripped
of funding to enforce the Noise Control Act since 1981, the law has never been
repealed. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, The Dormant Noise Control Act and
Options to Abate Noise Pollution (visited Nov. 1999) <http://www.nonoise.org/library/
shapiro/shapiro.htm>.
64. Noise Control Act § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (1994).
[Vol. 17
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wise. In fact, in light of the Supreme Court's conclusion in Han-
cock v. Train65 that a nearly identical waiver in the CAA lacked
adequate specificity to waive sovereign immunity for state permit-
ting requirements under that Act, the Noise Control Act's man-
date to federal agencies to "comply with Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements" would not even authorize the imposition
of state permitting requirements. 66
B. Statutes Which Provide Clear Authority for Civil Penalties
1. RCRA
Congress overturned DOE v. Ohio, at least as to its RCRA
holdings, through the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992.67
As amended, RCRA now provides clear authority for citizens,
states, and EPA to seek punitive fines against federal agencies to
enforce hazardous and solid waste violations.
a. Enforcement by Citizens and States
DOE v. Ohio held that, although the United States was specif-
ically listed as a "person" against whom a citizen suit could be
brought under Section 7002 of RCRA, and Section 7002 specifi-
cally authorized imposition of civil penalties, civil penalties were
not available against the United States under RCRA's citizen suit
provision.68 The Court reasoned that the civil penalties refer-
enced in RCRA's citizen suit provision only applied to "persons"
and the United States was not a "person" as that term was defined
in the general definitions section of RCRA.69 To overcome this
conclusion, the Federal Facilities Compliance Act amended the
definition of "person" in RCRA's general definitions section to "in-
clude each department, agency and instrumentality of the United
States."70
DOE v. Ohio also concluded that civil penalties against the
national government were not available under Section 6001,
RCRA's federal facilities provision, which subjects federal facili-
65. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
66. But see Exec. Order No. 12088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978) (requiring federal
agencies to ensure "that all necessary actions are taken for the prevention, control,
and abatement of environmental pollution with respect to Federal facilities and activ-
ities under the control of the agency," including pollution control standards estab-
lished pursuant to the Noise Control Act). Id.
67. Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a), (b), 106 Stat. 1505-06 (1992).
68. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
69. 503 U.S. at 617.
70. Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 103, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
1999]
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ties to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements" ap-
plicable to the management and disposal of solid or hazardous
waste.71 The Court found that this "all... requirements" phrase
could reasonably be interpreted as not necessarily including puni-
tive fines. 72 In response to this finding, the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act also added the following clarification to Section
6001 of RCRA:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and
procedural requirements referred to in this subsection include,
but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil and
administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such
penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are im-
posed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations. The
United States hereby expressly waives any immunity otherwise
applicable to the United States with respect to any such sub-
stantive or procedural requirement (including, but not limited
to, any injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or admin-
istrative penalty or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or
reasonable service charge).73
Although there have been a number of recent cases interpret-
ing the waiver of sovereign immunity under RCRA Section 6001,
as amended, none has involved a claim by the government that
immunity for civil penalties had not been waived under this sec-
tion.74 It thus appears undisputed that RCRA now permits states
and citizens to seek, through judicial and administrative enforce-
ment, the imposition of punitive fines against the federal
government. 75
71. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat. 1505. By authorizing civil penal-
ties "imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations," this amendment
also overruled Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484
U.S. 49 (1987) at least as to RCRA violations by federal facilities.
74. See, e.g., Charter Int'l Oil Co. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 104 (D.R.I. 1996)
(stating that RCRA waives federal sovereign immunity for past actions of federal gov-
ernment that violate state hazardous and solid waste laws, despite government's
claim that statutory phrase, "engaged in activity," indicates that waiver applies only
to agencies that are currently engaged in activity violating state laws); Crowley
Marine Services, Inc. v. Fednav Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (concluding
that RCRA waived sovereign immunity of Army Corps of Engineers from liability for
private cost recovery actions for damages under Washington's Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Act).
75. RCRA Section 6961(c) provides that a State that collects funds from the
United States under this authority may use such funds "only for projects designed to
[Vol. 17
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b. Enforcement by EPA
The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, has
long maintained that EPA lacks judicial enforcement authority
over federal agencies and may not bring suit against them.76
Under a doctrine known as the "unitary executive theory," a dis-
pute between two executive branch agencies is deemed to be non-
justiciable because no Article III "case or controversy" would exist
if the sovereign were to attempt to bring suit against itself.77 Be-
cause the unitary executive theory is perceived to pose a constitu-
tional limitation to judicial enforcement by EPA, Congress has not
attempted to grant EPA judicial enforcement power over federal
agencies. 78
However, the Federal Facilities Compliance Act did add
RCRA Section 6001(b), which granted EPA express authorization
to bring administrative enforcement actions against federal agen-
cies for violations of RCRA's solid and hazardous waste provi-
sions. 79  This provision authorizes EPA to initiate an
administrative enforcement action, "pursuant to the enforcement
authorities contained in this Act," against a federal agency "in the
same manner and under the same circumstances as an action
would be initiated against another person." 0 EPA's general ad-
ministrative enforcement authorities under RCRA, set out in Sec-
tion 3008(a), permits EPA to issue an order assessing a civil
penalty against a violator of up to $25,000 per day per violation.8 '
Section 6001(b) also provides that no such administrative order
improve or protect the environment or to defray the costs of environmental protection
or enforcement." 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c).
76. See, e.g., Ability of the Environmental Protection Agency to Sue Another Gov-
ernment Agency, 9 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 99 (1985), available in 1985 WL
1855398.
77. See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to James Gilliland, General Counsel, Department of Agricul-
ture, 6 (May 17, 1994). "We have reasoned that federal courts may adjudicate only
actual cases and controversies, that a lawsuit involving the same person as both
plaintiff and defendant does not constitute an actual controversy, and that this princi-
ple applies to suits between two agencies of the executive branch." Id.
78. Whether this constitutional limitation in fact exists has been much disputed
by commentators. See, e.g., Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can
The Federal Government Sue Itself? WM. & MARY L. REV., Summer 1991, at 897;
Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies? 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 317
(1990).
79. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(b), 106
Stat. 1505 (1992).
80. RCRA § 6001(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b)(1) (1994).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1994).
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will become final until the agency against which it is imposed has
had an opportunity to confer with EPA.82
2. The Safe Drinking Water Act
DOE v. Ohio also prompted amendment in 1996 of the Safe
Drinking Water Act's (SDWA) waiver of sovereign immunity for
federal facilities. Prior to these amendments, Section 1447 of the
Safe Drinking Water Act contained the identical "all. . . require-
ments" and "process and sanctions" language the Court in DOE v.
Ohio found to be an inadequate waiver for civil penalties imposed
under the CWA.8 3
a. Enforcement by Citizens and States
Using the same clarifying language the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act added to RCRA's federal facilities provision, the
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 199684 modified Section
1447 of the Act to provide a clear and unequivocal waiver of the
United States' immunity from punitive civil and administrative
sanctions.8 5 Like RCRA, SDWA Section 1447(c) now expressly
82. RCRA § 6001(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b)(1) (1994).
83. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 8(a), 91
Stat. 1393 (1977).
84. Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 129, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996).
85. SWDA § 1447(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (1994) now provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of the Federal Government ... shall be subject
to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local require-
ments, both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for
permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanc-
tions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief) ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as any person is subject to such require-
ments, including the payment of reasonable service charges. The Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural requirements
referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited to, all adminis-
trative orders and all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regard-
less of whether such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature
or are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations. The
United States hereby expressly waives any immunity otherwise applica-
ble to the United States with respect to any such substantive or proce-
dural requirement (including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief,
administrative order or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to
in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge) .... Neither the
United States, nor any agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be im-
mune or exempt from any process or sanction of any State or Federal
Court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief. No
agent, employee, or officer of the United States shall be personally liable
for any civil penalty under any Federal, State, interstate, or local law...
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/3
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provides for the imposition of civil penalties against the United
States, including penalties for wholly past violations, and restricts
the use of funds collected by States under this authority to
"projects designed to improve or protect the environment or to de-
fray the costs of environmental protection or enforcement."8 6
b. Enforcement by EPA
The 1996 SWDA Amendments also added Section 1447(b),
which authorizes EPA to impose administrative penalty orders for
violations of the Act by federal facilities.8 7 Like the administra-
tive enforcement authority granted to EPA under RCRA, SDWA
Section 1447(b) permits EPA to impose civil penalties against fed-
eral agencies and affords agencies an opportunity to confer with
EPA before any such penalty becomes final.8 8 Section 1447(b),
however, contains several additional features that are not present
in the parallel provision of RCRA.
First, SDWA Section 1447(b) also affords agencies the right to
notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record before any
penalty becomes final.8 9 Second, this subsection provides any in-
terested person the right to seek judicial review of a penalty order
issued against a federal agency.90 Finally, Section 1447(b) autho-
rizes the imposition of maximum penalties against federal agen-
cies that are greater than penalties that may be imposed against
non-federal entities.9 1 Under the SDWA's general administrative
enforcement provision, EPA may issue an administrative order as-
sessing a penalty of not more than $10,000 per day, up to a maxi-
mum administrative penalty of $125,000.92 Under Section
1447(b)(2), in contrast, EPA may administratively assess a pen-
alty against a federal agency of not more than $25,000 per day,
with no maximum fine specified. 93
with respect to any act or omission within the scope of the official duties
of the agent, employee, or officer....
Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(c).
87. Id. at § 300j-6(b)(1).
88. Id. at § 300j-6(b).
89. Id. at § 300j-6(b)(3).
90. Id. at § 300j-6(b)(4).
91. Id. at § 300j-6(b)(2).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(1).
93. Id. at § 300j-6(b)(2).
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3. Toxic Substances Control Act
Unlike every other major federal environmental pollution
statute considered in this article, the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) does not contain a general waiver of sovereign immu-
nity for federal facilities. That may be because the extent to which
TSCA applies to federal facilities at all is unclear.
Although TSCA Section 16 provides that civil penalties may
be assessed for certain violations against any "person,"94 the term
"person" is nowhere defined in the Act. Lacking any other general
waiver of federal sovereign immunity, TSCA thus fails to clearly
and unambiguously subject the United States to not only any such
penalties, but even to any requirement to comply with the Act at
all.95
The closest any provision in TSCA comes to subjecting federal
facilities to the Act's requirements is Section 22.96 TSCA Section
22 provides that EPA may "waive compliance with any provision
of this chapter upon a request and determination by the President
that the requested waiver is necessary in the interest of national
defense." 97 At best, Section 22 suggests by implication that na-
tional defense activities such as those performed by the Depart-
ment of Defense and Department of Energy implicitly are covered
by the TSCA. Otherwise, a provision authorizing a waiver for
such activities would be entirely superfluous. The Supreme
Court, however, has repeatedly stated that federal sovereign im-
munity may not be waived by implication.9"
TSCA does provide one clear waiver of sovereign immunity in
Section 408,99 which applies to control of lead-based paint hazards
at federal facilities. This provision, which was added in 1992100
following DOE v. Ohio, contains the identical clarifying language
94. Toxic Substances Control Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994).
95. But see Exec. Order No. 12088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978) (requiring federal
agencies to ensure "that all necessary actions are taken for the prevention, control,
and abatement of environmental pollution with respect to Federal facilities and activ-
ities under the control of the agency," including pollution control standards estab-
lished pursuant to TSCA). Id.
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 2621. This is the authority to which Executive Order 12088
refers to in directing that federal agencies comply with pollution control standards
under TSCA.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 2621.
98. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (concluding that a waiver of
the federal government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text and will not be implied).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2688.
100. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1021(a), 106 Stat. 3672, 3921 (1992).
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that now appears in RCRA and SDWA, permitting judicial and ad-
ministrative imposition of civil penalties against the United
States for lead-based paint violations at federal facilities.lol
a. Enforcement by States and Citizens
TSCA's citizen suit provision, Section 20, provides that "any
person may commence a civil action ... against any person (in-
cluding... the United States...) who is alleged to be in violation of
(this Chapter) .. ,"1o2 In contrast to the CWA and RCRA citizen
suit provisions the Supreme Court considered in DOE v. Ohio,
TSCA Section 20 contains no reference to sanctions, penalties, or
fines. This section therefore provides no independent basis for
seeking civil penalties for violations of TSCA.
b. Enforcement by EPA
Unlike SDWA and RCRA, TSCA Section 408 does not ex-
pressly provide for administrative enforcement by EPA. Section
408's waiver subjecting the United States to "Federal... require-
ments . . . includ[ing] . . . all administrative orders and all ...
administrative penalties and fines regardless of whether such
101. TSCA Section 408 provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in a lead-based paint hazard, and each officer, agent, or
employee thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural (in-
cluding any requirement for certification, licensing, recordkeeping, or re-
porting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may
be imposed by a court to enforce such relief) respecting lead-based paint,
lead-based paint activities, and lead-based paint hazards in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity is subject
to such requirements, including the payment of reasonable service
charges. The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and proce-
dural requirements referred to in this subsection include, but are not lim-
ited to, all administrative orders and all civil and administrative
penalties and fines regardless of whether such penalties or fines are puni-
tive or coercive in nature, or whether imposed for isolated, intermittent or
continuing violations. The United States hereby expressly waives any
immunity otherwise applicable to the United States with respect to any
such substantive or procedural requirement (including, but not limited to,
any injunctive relief, administrative order, or civil or administrative pen-
alty or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service
charge) ...
15 U.S.C. § 2688 (1994).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 20.
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penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature,"10 3 however,
does present an apparent basis for EPA to impose civil penalties
against federal facilities under its enforcement authorities pro-
vided by TSCA Section 17.104
C. Statutes With Uncertain Civil Penalties Provisions
1. CERCLA
The federal facilities provision of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 10 5
is set forth in Section 120 of that Act. 10 6 Unlike the federal facili-
ties provisions of other pollution statutes, CERCLA Section 120
does not subject the United States to penalties for violations of the
statute.10 7 Instead, Section 120 simply makes federal facilities li-
able for costs "in the same manner and to the same extent" as any
potentially responsible party under the Act.' 08 Although CER-
CIA remediation costs often may seem onerous, it is well settled
103. 15 U.S.C. § 2688 (1994).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2616 (1994).
105. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA §§ 101-405), 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
106. CERCLA Section 120(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1994), provides:
(1) In general
[Tihe United States... shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter
in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
§ 9607 of this title. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
liability of any person or entity under §§ 9606 and 9607 of this title .....
(4) State laws
State laws concerning removal and remedial action, including State laws
regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and remedial action at fa-
cilities owned or operated by . . . the United States . . . when such facili-
ties are not included on the National Priorities List. The preceding
sentence shall not apply to the extent a State law would apply any stan-
dard or requirement to such facilities which is more stringent than the
standards and requirements applicable to facilities which are not owned
or operated by any such department, agency, or instrumentality.
Id.
107. See id. The United States, however, may be liable for civil penalties for viola-
tion of an interagency agreement entered into pursuant to CERCIA Section 120. See
42 U.S.C. § 9622(1) (stating "[a] potentially responsible party which is a party to an
... agreement ... under Section 9620 of this title (relating to Federal facilities) ...
and which fails or refuses to comply with any term or condition of the order, decree or
agreement shall be subject to a civil penalty in accordance with Section 9609 of this
title") and 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)(1)(e) (stating "[a] civil penalty of not more than $25,000
per violation may be assessed by the President in the case of ... (a)ny failure or
refusal referred to in Section 9622(0) of this title (relating to violations of administra-
tive orders, consent decrees, or agreements under Section 9620 of this title).")
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/3
1999] GUIDE TO MONETARY SANCTIONS
that such costs are not punitive. 10 9 Thus, the distinction raised by
DOE v. Ohio between punitive and coercive penalties is not di-
rectly relevant to the waiver of sovereign immunity under CER-
CLA Section 120.110
CERCLA Section 120(a)(4), however, does subject the United
States to "[s]tate laws regarding enforcement" for clean-up activi-
ties at federal facilities that are not listed on the National Priori-
ties List.111 In Maine v. United States Department of the Navy, 112
the First Circuit held that CERCLA Section 120(a)(4) does not
permit imposition of punitive fines under Maine's hazardous
waste laws because it does not contain a clear and unequivocal
waiver of sovereign immunity. 113 The court likened the waiver of
sovereign immunity in CERCLA Section 120(a)(4) to the RCRA
waiver the Supreme Court considered in DOE v. Ohio, which pro-
vides that the federal government is subject to "all ... State...
requirements." The Court found the phrase "[s]tate laws regard-
ing enforcement" in Section 120(a)(4) to be ambiguous in the same
way as RCRA's federal facilities provision- the waiver could refer
to prospective coercive fines, to retrospective civil penalties, or to
109. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied., 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (holding that "CERCLA does not exact punishment ....
The restitution of cleanup costs was not intended to operate, nor does it operate in
fact, as a criminal penalty or a punitive deterrent.") Id.
110. CERCLA has generated substantial federal sovereign immunity litigation on
issues other than civil penalties, however. See, e.g. United States v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 778 F. Supp. 1328 (M.D.Pa. 1991) (rejecting United States'
claim that CERCLA Section 120(a)(4) only permits a state to order cleanup of a fed-
eral facility under provisions of a state law that is modeled on CERCLA); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 908 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1992)
(concluding that CERCLA Section 107(d)(1) does not waive sovereign immunity for
private party contribution claims based on EPA regulatory activities); United States
v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same conclu-
sion); United States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(same conclusion); FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838-
42 (3d Cir. 1994) (determining that sovereign immunity did not bar imposition of lia-
bility against United States for cleanup costs as an owner, operator, or arranger
under CERCLA Section 107 based on its close involvement in the operation of a war
materiels plant during World War II); Redland Soccer Club Inv. v. Dep't of Army, 801
F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that waiver of sovereign immunity under
CERCLA section 120(a)(4) only extends to facilities currently owned or operated by
the United States; therefore, United States not liable for cleanup costs at site it no
longer owns or operates); Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224
(W.D.Mich. 1993) (same conclusion).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4).
112. 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992).
113. See id.
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both.114 The court reached this conclusion even though CERCLA
Section 120(a)(4) contains none of the modifying, equitable limita-
tions contained in the CWA and RCRA federal facilities provisions
the Court examined in DOE v. Ohio.
2. RCRA Subtitle I
In 1984, Congress added Subtitle I to RCRA to impose federal
requirements on underground storage tanks."15 Subtitle I con-
tains a waiver of sovereign immunity for federal facilities, RCRA
Section 9007, that operates independently from the general RCRA
federal facilities provision, Section 6001, which the Court consid-
ered in DOE v. Ohio.
RCRA Section 9007(a) subjects federal facilities to "all Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local requirements" applicable to un-
derground storage tanks and provides that the United States shall
not be immune "from any process or sanction of any state or Fed-
eral Court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive
relief."1 6 This section was not amended by the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act.
a. Enforcement by Citizens and States
Although no published decision has addressed the issue, Sec-
tion 9007 would not permit the imposition of civil penalties
against the federal government in an enforcement action brought
by citizens or a state for violations of RCRA Subtitle I. In DOE v.
Ohio, the Court squarely considered and rejected the contention
that the identical waiver for "all ... State. . . requirements" that
appears in Section 9007 permitted the imposition of civil penalties
for RCRA violations by federal facilities." l7 DOE v. Ohio also com-
pels the conclusion that Section 9007's waiver for "any process or
sanction of any state or Federal Court with respect to the enforce-
114. Id. at 1010.
115. See Pub. L. 98-616, § 601(a), 98 Stat. 3286 (1984).
116. RCRA Section 9007(a), provides that the United States:
[S]hall be subject to and comply with all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, applicable to [underground storage tanks], both sub-
stantive and procedural, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as
any other person is subject to such requirements, including the payment
of reasonable service charges. Neither the United States, nor any agent,
employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any process
or sanction of any State or Federal court with respect to the enforcement
of any such injunctive relief.
42 U.S.C. § 6991f(a) (1994).
117. See 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
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ment of any such injunctive relief' permits at best the imposition
of coercive sanctions.118
b. Enforcement by EPA
While states and citizens may be precluded from seeking civil
penalties for underground storage tank violations by federal facili-
ties, EPA maintains that it does have such authority and has be-
gun to administratively assess civil penalties for underground
storage tank violations by federal facilities. 119
Although RCRA Section 9007 plainly lacks the clear and une-
quivocal expression of congressional intent to waive sovereign im-
munity from punitive fines that the Supreme Court demanded in
DOE v. Ohio, sovereign immunity generally is not implicated
where one Executive branch agency attempts to impose adminis-
trative fines over another. 120 Where the exercise of such authority
raises separation of powers concerns, the Department of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel has stated that the enabling statute need
only provide a "clear statement" that Congress intended to grant
this power to the enforcing agency. 121
The Department of Defense, however, disputes EPA's author-
ity to impose administrative fines under RCRA Subtitle I and has
refused to pay such fines. 122 The Department of Defense argues
that because Congress failed to amend RCRA Section 9007 when
it amended Section 6001 through the Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act, Congress has made no such "clear statement" that it in-
tended to empower EPA to impose punitive fines on federal
agencies for underground storage tank violations. 123
118. RCRA § 9007(2).
119. See Letter from Craig Hooks, Acting Director, Federal Facilities Enforcement
Office, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to Raymond Fatz, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Environment, Safety & Occupational Health, Department of the Army,
(August 26, 1997) (stating that RCRA provides the requisite "clear statement" of Con-
gress intent to grant EPA authority to assess civil penalties against a federal agency
for violations of RCRA Subtitle I).
120. See Memorandum from Dawn E. Johnson, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and Judith A. Miller, General Counsel, Department of Defense, (July
16, 1997).
121. Id.
122. See Letters from Robert S. Taylor, Deputy General Counsel (Environment &
Installations), Department of Defense, to Craig Hooks, Acting Director, Federal Facil-
ities Enforcement Office, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (January 20, 1998
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EPA, on the other hand, contends that RCRA does reflect the
requisite congressional intent.124 Under RCRA's statutory
scheme: Federal agencies are subject to "all Federal . . .(under-
ground storage tank) requirements;" 125 EPA is authorized to issue
a compliance order to any "person" in violation of the require-
ments of Subtitle I and to include a penalty with any such or-
der; 126 the definition of "person" for purposes of Subtitle I includes
the United States; 127 and EPA is authorized to bring an adminis-
trative enforcement action against the United States "pursuant to
the enforcement authorities contained in [RCRA]".128
In April 1999, the Department of Defense requested the Office
of Legal Counsel to issue an opinion on the authority of EPA to
assess administrative penalties against federal facilities under
RCRA Subtitle I. The Office of Legal Counsel is currently prepar-
ing an opinion to resolve this issue.
2. The Clean Air Act
a. Enforcement by States and Citizens
Before DOE v. Ohio was decided, every court to consider
whether the CAA permitted the imposition of civil penalties for
violations by federal facilities found that such penalties could be
imposed.129 Since then, only a handful of courts have considered
the impact of DOE v. Ohio on the scope of the waiver of sovereign
immunity under the CAA and their conclusions have differed
widely.130
124. See supra note 117.
125. RCRA § 9007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6991f(a) (1994).
126. See id. at § 9006(a).
127. See id. at § 9001(6).
128. Id. § 6001(b).
129. See Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 1987 WL 110399
(S.D.Ohio 1987) (determining that CAA Section 118 waived federal sovereign immu-
nity for fines and penalties); Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F.
Supp. 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (CAA section 118(a) permits imposition of civil penalties
by state); In re Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Payment of Civil Penalty for
Violation of Local Air Quality Standard, Op. Comptroller Gen. No. B-191747, 1978
WL 9814 (June 6, 1978) (holding that a federal agency may pay civil penalty imposed
administratively by a state for air emission violation under CAA Sections 118 and
304(e)); See also U.S. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that CAA Section 18 waives federal sovereign immunity as to
fees and taxes assessed by state agency).
130. See People of the State of California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality
Management Dist. v. U.S., 29 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. CA. 1998); U.S. v. Tennessee Air
Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. 975 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), affd, 1999 U.S. App.
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(1) Waiver Under CAA § 118
Most of the decisions finding a waiver of federal sovereign im-
munity for civil penalties under the CAA have relied on the Act's
federal facilities provision, Section 118. CAA Section 118(a)
states:
[T]he Federal Government... shall be subject to, and com-
ply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting
the control and abatement of air pollution .... The preceding
sentence shall apply ... to any process and sanction, whether
enforced in Federal, State, or local courts, or in any other man-
ner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity
of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or
rule of law. No officer, agent, or employee of the United States
shall be personally liable for any civil penalty for which he is not
otherwise liable. 131
Nearly all pre-DOE v. Ohio cases to examine Section 118 con-
cluded that the broad language contained in this Section, submit-
ting the United States to "all... State... requirements," including
"any process and sanctions," permitted the imposition of civil pen-
alties. 132 In DOE v. Ohio, however, the Supreme Court concluded
that the exact same waiver language in the federal facilities provi-
sions of the CWA and RCRA was sufficient to waive sovereign im-
munity only for "coercive" penalties necessary to compel
compliance with judicial process, and not for punitive fines calcu-
lated to punish past violations. 133
Only one post-DOE v. Ohio case, the district court decision in
United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board,34 has
held that CAA Section 118 permits the imposition of punitive
sanctions against federal facilities. 135 The court in that case
found the RCRA and CWA federal facilities provisions analyzed by
LEXIS 16863 (6th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 897 F.
Supp.1464 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
131. Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994).
132. U.S. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732, 738
(C.D. Cal. 1990); Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (M.D. Fla.
1986); Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Payment of Civil Penalty for Violation
of Local Air Quality Standard, Op. Comptroller Gen. No. B-191747, 1978 WL 9814, 3
(June 6, 1978).
133. See supra notes 30-37 and 45-47 and accompanying text.
134. 967 F. Supp. 975 (M.D.Tenn.1997), affd on other grounds, 1999 U.S. App.
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the Court in DOE v. Ohio to be distinguishable from CAA Section
118.136
Section 118 does differ in several important respects from the
provisions Court considered in DOE v. Ohio. First, aside from the
"all . . . requirements" and "process and sanctions" language it
shares in common with the CAA, the federal facilities' provision of
the CWA contains additional qualifying language that does not ap-
pear in the CAA. This language provides that the "United States
shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal
law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the
process of such court."137
Similarly, the federal facilities provision contained in RCRA
at the time DOE v. Ohio was decided, stated that the United
States was subject to all requirements respecting solid and haz-
ardous waste, "including any requirement for permits or reporting
or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may
be imposed by a court to enforce such relief."138 The CAA, in con-
trast, lacks any such limitation as to the scope of relief available.
Despite the textual differences between the Acts, however,
the author concludes in the following discussion that the Supreme
Court's interpretation in DOE v. Ohio of the phrases "process and
sanctions" and "all. . . requirements" as used in the CWA and
RCRA should still control the meaning of these same words as
used in CAA Section 118.
(A) Section 118(a)'s Waiver for State "Process and
Sanctions" Does Not Permit the Imposition of
Civil Penalties
In its examination in DOE v. Ohio of the scope of the waiver
for State "process and sanctions" contained in Section 313 of the
CWA, the Court first interpreted the term "sanction" by itself.139
As noted previously, the Court found that, while the meaning of
"sanction" is broad enough to include both punitive and coercive
fines, "the term carries no necessary implication that a reference
to punitive fines is intended."140 Only after construing the mean-
ing of "sanction" in isolation and then in the context of the phrase
136. See id. at 980. See also Celebrezze, 1987 WL 110399, at 7 (distinguishing the
CAA's federal facilities section from the equivalent provisions in the CWA and RCRA).
137. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994).
138. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 627.
139. See id. at 620-21.
140. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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"process and sanction," did the Court then consider the effect of
the section's additional language limiting the scope of such
sanctions.141
The Court did find that the language limiting the United
States' liability to only "civil penalties arising under Federal law
or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the pro-
cess of such court" served to "clarify or limit the waiver preceding
it."142 But the Court's conclusion that the meaning of "sanctions"
included both punitive and coercive fines plainly did not turn on
the clarifying effect of this limiting language.
In fact, because the Court determined that the phrase "civil
penalties arising under Federal law" was an "expansive but uncer-
tain waiver," it ultimately gave this language no effect. 143 As one
district court noted, if the Supreme Court was unable to give
meaning to this passage of the CWA's federal facilities provision,
the fact that the equivalent provision in the CAA lacks such lan-
guage could hardly serve to clarify the scope of the waiver under
the CAA.' 44
(B) Section 118(a)'s Waiver for "All ... Requirements"
Does Not Permit the Imposition of Civil
Penalties
The Supreme Court used a similar approach in its analysis of
the language in RCRA's federal facilities provision requiring the
United States' compliance with "all ... requirements ... (includ-
ing... such sanctions imposed by a court to enforce such relief)."
Before reaching the limiting language contained in parenthesis,
the Court first considered the meaning of the phrase "all require-
ments" standing alone. 145 The Court stated that "all ... require-
ments ... can reasonably be interpreted as including substantive
standards and the means for implementing those standards, but
excluding punitive measures. "146
Only then did the Court consider the limiting effect of the
modifying equitable language. Thus, the Court's conclusion that
141. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
142. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 624.
143. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 897 F. Supp. 1464,
1471 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (stating that no waiver under Section 118). See also California
v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656 (E.D. Ca. 1998).
145. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.




70 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the phrase "all ... requirements" does not necessarily include pu-
nitive sanctions was not dependent on the parenthetical phrase
"including ... such sanctions imposed by a court to enforce such
relief." Instead, the Court found that the additional equitable lan-
guage merely bolstered the conclusion it reached when it consid-
ered the phrase in isolation.147 Accordingly, the absence of this
language from CAA Section 118 does not prevent the Court's con-
clusion that the phrase "all ... requirements" in RCRA does not
include civil penalties from controlling the meaning of the identi-
cal phrase in the CAA.
(C) No Other Portion of Section 118(a) Provides a
Waiver for Civil Penalties
The lower court opinion in Tennessee Air Pollution Control
Board also found support for a waiver of civil penalties in the
third and fourth sentences of CAA Section 118(a). 148 That portion
of Section 118(a) states:
This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity
of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or
rule of law. No officer, agent, or employee of the United States
shall be personally liable for any civil penalty for which he is not
otherwise liable. 149
The court noted that, while the first of these two sentences
precludes any assertion of sovereign immunity by all governmen-
tal entities, the second exempts all of these entities, except agen-
cies, from civil penalties. 150 The court reasoned that because
agencies were not exempted from civil penalties, Congress must
necessarily have intended to subject them to such sanctions.1 5'
Otherwise, the court stated, "there is no conceivable reason why
Congress would have included language exempting certain indi-
vidual governmental actors from those penalties, and the phrase
would be superfluous." 152
147. See 503 U.S. at 628.
148. See United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. 975,
980-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), affd on other grounds, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16863 (6th
Cir. 1999).
149. CAA § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994).
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There are two problems with this argument. First, this very
same language from CAA Section 118(a) also appears in CWA Sec-
tion 313(a), 153 yet the Supreme Court held in DOE v. Ohio that
that section of the CWA does not waive sovereign immunity for
civil penalties imposed by a state.154 Moreover, it is doubtful that
a negative inference drawn from the clarification that federal of-
ficers, agents, and employees are not personally liable for civil
penalties as a result of the waiver of sovereign immunity in CAA
Section 118(a) evinces the requisite unequivocal expression of con-
gressional intent to waive federal sovereign that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly demanded.1 55
(D) A Waiver for Civil Penalties Cannot Be Derived
From the Legislative History of CAA Section
118(a)
The legislative history of the 1977 CCA amendments that ad-
ded Section 118 plainly reveals Congress' intent to waive sover-
eign immunity from civil penalties.1 56 In finding a waiver for civil
penalties in Section 118, several courts, including the district
court in Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board, looked to the Act's
legislative history to support their holdings. 57 Use of legislative
history in this way was consistent with the Supreme Court's sov-
153. CWA Section 313(a)(2)(C), provides: "This subsection shall apply notwith-
standing any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law
or rule of law ... No officer, agent, or employee of the United States shall be person-
ally liable for any civil penalty... for which he is not otherwise liable. .. ." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a)(2)(c) (1994).
154. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (determining that a waiver of
the federal government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text and will not be implied); United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531
(1995) (stating that any ambiguity in such waiver must be strictly construed in favor
of immunity); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (concluding
that a waiver of sovereign immunity that affects the public fisc must extend unam-
biguously to such monetary claims).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 294, at 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1279 stating:
The applicable sanctions are to be the same for Federal facilities and per-
sonnel as for privately owned pollution sources and for the owners or op-
erators thereof. This means that Federal facilities and agencies may be
subject to injunctive relief (and criminal or civil contempt citations to en-
force any such injunctions), to civil or criminal penalties, and to delayed
compliance penalties.
Id.
157. See Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd, 967 F. Supp. at 979; See also Ala-
bama ex rel Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 1996);
Ohio ex rel Celebrezze v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 1987 WL 110399 at 7.
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ereign immunity jurisprudence, 15s at least until the Court decided
United States v. Nordic Village. 59
In Nordic Village, a 1992 case that preceded DOE v. Ohio, the
Court stated that, in analyzing a waiver of sovereign immunity,
legislative history cannot provide the requisite clarity of congres-
sional intent that is otherwise lacking in the statutory text. 60
The Court stated: "the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statu-
tory text. If clarity does not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a
committee report."' 6 '
Thus, if any waiver of sovereign immunity for punitive fines is
to be found in the CAA, it must be found within the language of
the statute itself and without reference to extrinsic sources. 62
(2) Waiver Under CAA Section 304
Apart from CAA Section 118, the Act's citizen suit provision,
Section 304, also provides possible grounds for a waiver that
would permit the imposition of civil penalties against the United
States. In fact, in determining whether the CWA or RCRA pro-
vided such a waiver, the first sections the Court examined in DOE
v. Ohio were the Acts' citizen suit provisions. 163 Although the
Court found that such a waiver did not exist in those sections, the
CAA's citizen suit provision is readily distinguishable from the
CWA and RCRA citizen suit provisions the Court considered in
DOE v. Ohio.
In DOE v. Ohio, the Court found that, although the citizen
suit provisions of both the CWA and RCRA permit the imposition
of civil penalties, such penalties could only be applied to "persons"
as that term was generally defined in the statute. 64 Because the
United States was omitted from the general definition of "person"
in the CWA and in RCRA, the Court concluded the United States
158. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text, discussing the Court's use of
legislative history in Hancock v. Train to support its conclusion that CAA Section 118
only obligated federal installations to comply with state substantive requirements,
but not with procedural requirements.
159. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
160. Id. at 37. See also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
161. 503 U.S. at 37.
162. This conclusion also necessarily precludes consideration of arguments, such
as those discussed by the district court in Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd, 967 F.
Supp. at 983, regarding the desirability from a public policy standpoint of a waiver of
federal sovereign immunity for civil penalties under the CAA.
163. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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was not among the class of "person(s)" subject to civil penalties
under the citizen suit provisions of either Act.165
Just as in the citizen suit provisions contained in the CWA
and RCRA, CAA Section 304(a) allows "any person" to initiate a
civil action "against any person (including... the United States)"
and grants jurisdiction to the district courts "to enforce such an
emission standard or limitation ... and to apply any appropriate
civil penalties."1 66 Unlike the general definitions of "person" in
the CWA and RCRA provisions the Court considered in DOE v.
Ohio, however, CAA Section 302(e) specifically lists the United
States as being among the "persons" who can be sued under the
Act.167
Subsection 304(e) of the CAA also distinguishes that provi-
sion from the citizen suit provisions in the CWA and RCRA. The
first sentence of CAA Section 304(e)168 contains a savings clause
that is essentially identical to the savings clauses contained in the
CWA169 and RCRA.170 However, Section 304(e), also contains two
additional sentences, discussed more fully below, relating to fed-
eral sovereign immunity that are not present in either the CWA or
RCRA. Because of these textual differences between the statutes,
the Court's finding in DOE v. Ohio that there is no waiver of civil
penalties under the citizen suit provisions contained in the CWA
and RCRA by no means precludes the possible existence of such a
waiver under CAA Section 304.
165. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
166. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e).
168. CAA § 304(e) provides "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (includ-
ing relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1994).
169. CWA § 505(e) provides "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (includ-
ing relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1994).
170. See RCRA § 7002(f), provides "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the management of solid
waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency)." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1994).
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(A) Waiver for Civil Penalties Imposed in a State
Judicial or Administrative Proceeding
Of the pre-DOE v. Ohio decisions to consider whether the
CAA waives sovereign immunity for civil penalties, only one
reached the issue of whether Section 304 waives federal sovereign
immunity from civil penalties administratively imposed by a state
or locality and concluded without analysis that it did. 171
In the first post-DOE v. Ohio case to decide the issue, the
court in United States v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources
found that CAA Section 304 does not permit the imposition of civil
penalties against the United States in a state administrative en-
forcement proceeding. 172 The court began its analysis of Section
304 by noting that DOE v. Ohio found that the incomplete incorpo-
ration of the civil penalty portions of the CWA and RCRA into
their respective citizen suit sections prevented the imposition of
punitive civil fines against the United States. 173 But because Sec-
tion 304 "does not reference a civil penalty section," the court rea-
soned that the rationale of DOE v. Ohio is inapplicable.1 74
Therefore, the court stated, the cross-reference to the CAA's fed-
eral facilities provision in the last sentence of Section 304(e) ("For
provisions requiring compliance by the United States..., see [CAA
Section 1181") indicated that the scope of the Act's waiver must be
defined by that section.1 75
The district court in United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution
Control Board, which also involved a state administrative enforce-
ment proceeding, reached essentially the same conclusion as the
Georgia Department of National Resources court, at least with re-
spect to Section 304.176 Although the lower court in Tennessee Air
Pollution Control Board found that Section 304 authorizes state
suits against federal agencies for recovery of civil penalties as-
sessed under state clean air statutes,1 77 it stopped short of finding
171. See Matter of Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Payment of Civil Pen-
alty for Violation of Local Air Quality Standard, Op. Comptroller Gen. No. B-191747,
1978 WL 9814, at 2 (June 6, 1978).
172. See 897 F. Supp. 1464 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
173. Id. at 1470.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Tennessee APCB, 967 F. Supp. at 975. However, Tennessee APCB, unlike
Georgia DNR, found that CAA Section 118 waives federal sovereign immunity from
civil penalties. See supra notes 118-119.
177. See 967 F. Supp. at 978. Because Tennessee APCB involved a state adminis-
trative enforcement proceeding, the court's statement as to the possibility of a waiver
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a waiver for civil penalties in Section 304 independent from the
waiver provided under Section 118. Rather, the court concluded
that the cross-reference in the last sentence of Section 304(e) to
CAA Section 118 simply "connects [the state's] right to sue under
Section 304 with its authority to apply any sanction in Section
118."178
Surprisingly, the district court opinions in Georgia Air Pollu-
tion Control Board and Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board did
not examine in any detail the second and third sentences in Sec-
tion 304(e) to determine whether that subsection provides a
waiver of sovereign immunity that is separate from the waiver in
section 118 for penalties imposed in state judicial and administra-
tive enforcement proceedings. Although the state agency in Ten-
nessee Air Pollution Control Board squarely asserted that Section
304(e) waives the United States' immunity from state civil law
penalties, 179 the district court in that case apparently concluded
that that section provides only a waiver from suit, not a waiver
from civil penalties.18 0 The court in Georgia Department of Natu-
ral Resources simply did not find it necessary to reach the issue at
all.'"' When the appeal from the district court's opinion in Ten-
nessee Air Pollution Control Board reached the Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals picked up where the district court left
off. 182
CAA Section 304(e) is titled "Nonrestriction of other rights."
The first sentence of Section 304(e) provides, "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement
of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the administrator or a State agency)."18 3
The Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board
concedes that this sentence clearly is, like its nearly identical pro-
visions in the CWA and RCRA;184 a savings clause. 85 The Court
under § 304 for civil penalties imposed in a judicial enforcement proceeding is clearly
dicta.
178. 967 F. Supp. at 981.
179. See id. at 977.
180. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
182. See United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529 (6th
Cir. 1999).
183. CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1994).
184. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
185. See Tennessee APCB, 185 F.3d at 532.
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of Appeals, however, concluded, contrary to the finding of every
post-DOE v. Ohio court to consider the issue, including the district
court in the case below that the second sentence of Section 304(e)
provides a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity
that permits the imposition of civil penalties. 86
The second sentence of Section 304(e), which was added as
part of the CAA Amendments of 1977 that followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Hancock v. Train,8 7 states:
Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit, exclude, or restrict any
State, local, or interstate authority from
(1) bringing any enforcement action or obtaining any judi-
cial remedy or sanction in any State or local court, or
(2) bringing any administrative enforcement action or ob-
taining any administrative remedy or sanction in any State or
local administrative agency, department or instrumentality,
against the United States... under State or local law respecting
control and abatement of air pollution.l88
Unlike the sentence that precedes it, this sentence does not
relate to the preservation of any existing right. Instead, it appar-
ently creates, or confirms the creation of a right that previously
did not exist. Thus, the Court of Appeals concludes that the sec-
ond sentence of Section 304(e), although framed in the negative
("[n] othing in.. . any other law of the United States"), provides an
affirmative, independent waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
Given Congress' declaration in Section 304(e) that neither 304(a)
nor "any other law of the United States" restricts states from ob-
taining any judicial or administrative remedy or sanction, the
court found that this must mean that there is no law (including
the law of federal sovereign immunity) that precludes the State of
Tennessee from obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction
against a federal air polluter. 189 Although the Sixth Circuit's tex-
tual analysis of CAA Section 304(e) appears facially reasonable, it
186. See id at 533. The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Section 304 is anything
other than a savings clause is also inconsistent with the holding of the Fourth Circuit
in Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 524 (1996), in which that court found that
the sole meaning of Section 304(e) is "that the citizen suit provision does not preempt
any other available remedies."
187. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 303(c), 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
188. CAA § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1994). No equivalent provision exists in
either the CWA or RCRA.
189. See Tennessee APCB, 185 F.3d at 533.
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is inconsistent with the sovereign immunity analysis the Supreme
Court applied in DOE v. Ohio.
As previously discussed, the Court in DOE v. Ohio flatly re-
jected Ohio's contention that the word "sanction" as used in the
CWA's federal facilities provision necessarily included civil penal-
ties. 190 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit asserts that the state "ad-
ministrative remedy or sanction," to which the United States is
subjected by Section 304(e), must mean a civil penalty in the puni-
tive sense, because virtually all state agencies lack the authority
to impose coercive contempt penalties to compel compliance with
their process or orders. 191
The court's argument may, in other words, be expressed as
follows: (1) The Supreme Court has stated that the meaning of
"sanctions" is broad enough to encompass both coercive and puni-
tive penalties; (2) "sanctions" may, but does not necessarily denote
punitive fines; (3) if "sanctions," as used in Section 304(e) does not
include punitive fines, then the only penalties permitted under
that provision must be coercive ones; (4) nearly all state agencies,
however, lack the authority to impose coercive penalties; and (5)
therefore, if Section 304(e) does not authorize punitive sanctions,
the provision is virtually meaningless, at least as to the authority
it apparently provides for state administrative proceedings. 192
If Section 304(e) does not provide authority to state agencies
to impose punitive fines against the United States, the provision is
not necessarily surplusage. More likely, Section 304(e) simply re-
affirms the authority granted to states by Section 118 to subject
the United States to "process and sanctions," which authority, as
discussed previously, does not permit for the imposition of civil
penalties. 193 This reading of Section 304(e) is reinforced by the
subsection's last sentence, which states: "For provisions requiring
compliance by the United States . . . see [CAA Section 118." 194
This construction may well, as the Court of Appeals notes,
"render [Section 302(e)(2)] virtually meaningless" because the au-
thority granted to state agencies by that section to impose "sanc-
190. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
191. See Tennessee APCB, 185 F.3d at 532, n.3, citing Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) (determining that agency does not have
"authority to compel obedience to its orders by judgment of fine").
192. In contrast, state judicial proceedings, which also are apparently authorized
by Section 304(e) to impose any "remedy or sanction," unquestionably do have general
authority to impose coercive sanctions.
193. See supra notes 126-147 and accompanying text.
194. CAA § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1994).
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tions" against the United States would then allow for the
imposition of neither punitive nor coercive penalties. 195 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that a waiver
of sovereign immunity that opens the public fisc may not be found
by implication. 196
In DOE v. Ohio, the Court was unable to give meaning to the
CWA's authorization for "civil penalties arising under Federal
law."' 97 The Court explained:
The question is still what Congress could have meant in us-
ing a seemingly expansive phrase like "civil penalties arising
under Federal law." Perhaps it used it just in case some later
amendment might waive the Government's immunity from pu-
nitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought that lia-
bility for such sanctions had somehow been waived already.
Perhaps someone was careless. 198
This explanation applies with equal force to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's construction of Section 304(e) and compels the same conclu-
sion. Moreover, Congress' use of the term "civil penalties" in
subsection (a) of Section 304, but not in subsection (e), makes clear
that Congress knows how to designate such penalties when it in-
tends to. 199
(B) Waiver for Civil Penalties Imposed by a District
Court
Remarkably, there are no published decisions examining the
authority the CAA clearly grants the district courts to impose civil
penalties against the United States.
Section 304(a) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
jurisdiction ... to enforce [air pollution standards or limitations]
... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties."200 Civil penal-
ties for air pollution violations in turn are specifically authorized
195. See Tennessee APCB, 185 F.3d at 532, n.3.
196. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
197. Supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
198. 503 U.S. at 626-27.
199. See e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (stating that "where Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion").
200. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
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by Section 113.201 When read together with its other applicable
provisions, the CAA thus authorizes a civil action to be brought
"against any person (including ... the United States) ... who is
alleged to have violated ... or to be in violation of ... an emission
standard or limitation;"20 2 grants jurisdiction to the district courts
"to enforce such an emission standard or limitation ... and to ap-
ply any appropriate civil penalties;"20 3 specifically provides for the
imposition of "civil penalties" against any "person," as that term is
generally defined, for a violation of an emission standard or limi-
tation;20 4 and includes the United States within its general defini-
tion of "person."20 5
The CAA's statutory scheme thus provides a clear and une-
quivocal waiver of sovereign immunity that permits a federal dis-
trict court to impose monetary sanctions to punish past CAA
violations by a federal facility.206
b. Enforcement by EPA
CAA Section 113(d)(1) grants EPA authority to impose a civil
administrative penalty against any "person" of up to $25,000 per
day of violation, up to a maximum penalty of $200,000.207 Simi-
larly, under the field citation program authorized by Section 113,
EPA may assess against any "person" civil penalties of up to
201. CAA § 113(b). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994) authorizes the imposition of a civil
penalty against any person of up to $25,000 per day for each violation of a permit
emission standard or limitation. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994).
202. CAA § 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994).
203. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
204. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994).
205. CAA § 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1994). The general definition of "person"
was expanded as part of the 1977 CAA Amendments to include "any agency, depart-
ment, or instrumentality of the United States." Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 301(b), 91 Stat.
685 (1977). The committee report that accompanied the House bill in which this
amendment was introduced stated:
Finally, in defining the term "person" . . . to include Federal agencies,
departments, and instrumentalities, officers, agents, or employees, the
committee is expressing its unambiguous intent that the enforcement au-
thorities of section 113 may be used to ensure compliance and/or to im-
pose sanctions against any federal violator of the act.
H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1279. The
value of this legislative history would otherwise provide, however, has been signifi-
cantly diminished by Nordic Village. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
206. The Court in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio noted that it was undis-
puted that the "civil penalties" referenced in those sections authorize punitive fines.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
207. CAA § 113(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (1994).
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$5,000 per day of violation. 208 As noted previously, the United
States is included within the Act's general definition of "per-
son,"209 and therefore is subject to civil penalties administratively
assessed by EPA under the provisions of Section 113.210
IV. Conclusion
Civil penalties are one of the most powerful enforcement
mechanisms that may be used to compel a federal facility's envi-
ronmental compliance. The Supreme Court's holding in DOE v.
Ohio significantly narrowed the availability of civil penalties as a
sanction against federal agencies. Congress has acted to override
DOE v. Ohio, at least as to violations of RCRA's hazardous and
solid waste provisions, SWDA, and the lead-based paint regula-
tions of TSCA. DOE v. Ohio, nonetheless still directly precludes
the imposition of civil penalties under the CWA, and limits the
scope of the waivers of sovereign immunity under the CAA and
CERCLA.
In short, Congress' response to DOE v. Ohio has been slow
and remains incomplete. In the meantime, the reaction of states
seeking to compel the compliance of federal facilities within their
borders has, in some respects, been puzzling.
For example, every published decision raising the question of
whether the waiver of sovereign immunity under the CAA permits
the imposition of civil penalties, both before DOE v. Ohio and af-
ter, has arisen out of a state administrative enforcement proceed-
ing. Until the CAA is amended to overcome DOE v. Ohio, this
paper concludes that no such authority exists, at least in the con-
text of a state judicial or administrative enforcement proceeding,
and that Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board's conclusion to the
contrary is mistaken.
The author believes, however, the authority for states to ob-
tain civil penalties against the United States for air pollution vio-
lations does exist, but only in enforcement proceedings brought in
federal district court. It is unclear as to why states, given the
Court's decision in DOE v. Ohio, continue to pursue punitive sanc-
208. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
209. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
210. See Memorandum from Dawn E. Johnson, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and Judith A. Miller, General Counsel, Department of Defense, (July
16, 1997) (concluding that EPA may administratively assess civil penalties under
CAA Section 113(d) against federal agencies).
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tions for violations by federal facilities in state administrative pro-
ceedings, rather than in federal district court.
Similarly, while DOE v. Ohio may prevent states from seek-
ing civil penalties under the CWA, the United States conceded in
that case that the waiver for "process and sanctions" under the
federal facilities provision subjects federal agencies to coercive
fines-that is, fines imposed to induce them to comply with injunc-
tions or other judicial orders designed to modify behavior prospec-
tively.211 Accordingly, coercive fines may be imposed against the
United States in any state or federal judicial enforcement action
under the CWA. 212 This same authority also exists under the
CAA. 2 1 3
The Court in DOE v. Ohio stated that a coercive sanction is
one that is designed to modify behavior prospectively, rather than
punish conduct that already has occurred.214 Given this meaning,
there is no apparent reason why a state seeking to sanction a fed-
eral facility for on-going CWA or CAA violations could not avoid
the bar against punitive sanctions by seeking a compliance order
or consent decree that provides for stipulated penalties for future
violations. While a federal agency would likely object to such stip-
ulated penalties, an objection based on DOE v. Ohio would not
appear to be well founded.
Enforcement of air pollution violations in federal court and
the use of stipulated penalties as coercive sanctions in CWA and
CAA cases would fill a significant void as states and citizens seek-
ing to compel environmental compliance by federal facilities con-
tinue to wait for Congress to finish its incomplete response to DOE
v. Ohio.
211. 503 U.S. at 613.
212. CWA Section 313(a)(2)(C) states the United States "shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative au-
thority, and process and sanctions ... respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution" including "any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or
local courts or in any other manner." 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1994).
213. CAA Section 118(a)(2)(D) states The United States "shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative au-
thority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollu-
tion," including "any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts, or in any other manner." 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(2)(D) (1994).
214. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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